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Navigating the Pitfalls of  
Maritime Mediations
Introduction
The shipping industry in the United States often involves the performance of complex 
maritime contracts.  It is not uncommon for the parties to these contracts to engage 
in disputes when one of these contracts is breached by one of the contracting 
parties. When this happens, there are four primary methods for resolving these 
disputes: direct negotiation, litigation, arbitration, or mediation. 
Background
This article will first briefly examine the particulars of the primary methods for 
resolving maritime contract disputes. The article will then conclude by focusing on 
some of the pitfalls that parties should avoid when attempting to resolve a maritime 
contract dispute. 
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The Uncertain Status of the Puerto Rico 
Ports Authority: Working Towards a Uniform 
Arm-of-the-State Test
I. INTRODUCTION
Many port authorities are allocated special status and therefore partake in the 
parent state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity as effective arms-of-the-state. This 
serves several important policy goals, yet the precedent surrounding the arm-of-
the-state test is muddled. This results in different tests and standards, depending on 
the court hearing the case, leading to different results for different entities. The Port 
Authority of Puerto Rico (“PRPA”) is in an especially vulnerable situation, due to its 
dual function as a governmental and corporate entity. The unclear status of what 
role the function of an entity should play in determining its status under the Eleventh 
Amendment has produced conflicting holdings for the PRPA in various cases, 
even within the same circuit.  Such lack of clarity erodes public policy reasons for 
according arms-of-the-state special status under the Eleventh Amendment.
This paper will explain how this special vulnerability came to be by examining the 
legal theory of arm-of-the-state immunity in general. Then, specific application in 
cases involving the PRPA will be addressed. A path toward greater predictability 
and certainty will then be examined.
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A.  Generally
Sovereign immunity is a legal doctrine sounding in common law which leaves the 
king immune from suit in his own courts.2 This common-law concept has been 
embraced by the United States in several forms, including immunity for foreign 
sovereigns and the federal government.3 The Supreme Court of the United States 
has found the common-law concept to be embedded in the structure of the U.S. 
Constitution.4 The sovereignty of both foreign and domestic entities has been 
recognized by U.S. courts.5
The Eleventh Amendment has long been held as the embodiment of the common-
law concept as it pertains to states.6 According to the Eleventh Amendment: “The 
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit 
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”7 Read in 
“light of historical evidence,” this limits the diversity jurisdiction of Article III, §2 short 
Read more on page 32
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of actions brought by citizens against states.8 However, there is a long history of 
judicial interpretation “injecting broad notions of sovereign immunity into the whole 
corpus of federal jurisdiction” from the Eleventh Amendment.9 States are held to be 
entitled to immunity from suit in federal court not only when diversity is invoked,10 but 
also when a federal question is raised, or the cause of action lies with admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction,11 unless the state has waived that right. 12
The “immediate purpose” of the Eleventh Amendment was, as Hector Blaudell 
explains, as “closing state treasuries to federal courts.”13 It has also been interpreted 
broadly as “confirming sovereign immunity as a constitutional principle and thus 
protecting states’ dignity interests.”14 The primary goal of protection of state interests 
may be agreed upon by the courts, but the application of the principle has not been 
uniform, leading to disparate tests between circuits. One area in which this disarray 
becomes obvious is when courts grant corresponding Eleventh Amendment 
immunity to entities organized under state law to be arms of the state.
B.  Sovereign Immunity for Arms of the State
The Eleventh Amendment bars actions against the state itself and against entities 
deemed to be arms of the state. Entities deemed to be “sufficiently close to the 
state so as to, in effect, be part of the state itself” are entitled to immunity as 
states themselves.15 This practice serves several important purposes, including 
protection of state dignity and state fisc from federal interference.16 By allowing a 
state to structure an entity that performs a vital state purpose to share its Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, the state may, as Blaudell explains, “promote effective public 
administration” by allowing the entity relative autonomy without fear of liability by 
the entity.17 If a State and a private actor form an economic partnership for a State 
purpose but the private actor is left vulnerable to potential liability while the State is 
not, this puts the private party at an imbalanced risk.18 The state’s treasury – and 
therefore its dignitary interests – is opened to risk if the State may be hailed into 
federal court because of the transaction. Despite the multitude of cases, there is 
still no uniform test for establishing when or what type of entity is entitled to such 
immunity.19 And even though the Supreme Court addressed the issue somewhat 
recently20, there remain significant gaps.
C.  Puerto Rico is treated as a State for the Purposes of the  
      Eleventh Amendment.
While courts routinely grant immunity for entities established as arms of states, the 
same is not true for territories and other federal bodies.21 Federal entities like the 
District of Columbia and territories like the Northern Mariana Islands and the U.S. 
Uncertain Status... continued from page 12
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Virgin Islands are not entitled to the same immunity as a state.22 However, Puerto 
Rico, while not a state, has consistently been accorded Eleventh Amendment 
immunity by courts of appeal, especially the First Circuit. The Supreme Court 
has declined to directly address Puerto Rico’s constitutional status23 for sovereign 
immunity.24 
Several courts, most notably the First Circuit and D.C. Circuit, have recognized 
Puerto Rico’s status under the Eleventh Amendment. 25  The First Circuit considers 
Puerto Rico’s immunity as “settled,” a “verity,” “consistently held,” and “beyond 
dispute.”26 The D.C. Circuit has held that the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act 
grants Puerto Rico the same sovereign immunity that sates possess from suits 
arising under federal law.”27 This special treatment of Puerto Rico has elevated the 
Commonwealth to a state-like status for the Eleventh Amendment.
D.  History of Cases 
Having ascertained that Puerto Rico enjoys the same immunity accorded states, we 
next turn our attention to the types of entities to which a court will grant immunity. 
The Supreme Court has addressed arm-of-the-state Eleventh Amendment 
immunity on several occasions. While the Court has addressed the issue fairly 
recently, it is informative to look to past cases to determine what factors the Court 
has traditionally considered relevant in determining immunity under arm-of-the-state 
doctrine. In Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle,28 the 
Court determined a school board was not immune in a contract dispute. In making 
the determination that the school board was more akin to a political subdivision 
(and therefore not entitled to immunity), the Court looked to several factors: the 
entity’s designation under state law, the supervision of the state over the entity, 
funding received by the entity from the state, and whether the entity generated its 
own revenue.29 The Court determined that the school board’s status under state law 
as a municipal entity and ability to generate its own revenue outweighed the state’s 
financial assistance and administrative control, factors that would have pointed 
toward the board being an arm. The Court focused on the “nature of the entity,” its 
treatment by state law, and its closeness to the state’s treasury,30 but did not explain 
the weight it gave to the different factors it assessed.31
Immediately after Mount Healthy, the Supreme Court again addressed the issue 
in Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency32 (“Lake Country”). 
At issue was whether the agency, created by the compact, acted under federal 
authority (by virtue of the compact) or under color of state law when conducting 
land management functions. Due to its nature as a compact clause entity, the intent 
of the states in forming the agency, and the actual operation of the agency, the 
agency was not entitled to immunity.33 Simpson-Wood suggests that the Court here 
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offered more guidance than it did in Mount Healthy by providing a longer list of 
relevant factors,34 including an analysis of the agency’s organic statute, the power to 
appoint officials, the source of funding for the entity, whether the agency’s financial 
obligations were binding on the state, which government (local or state) was involved 
in the entity’s functions, and whether agency action was subject to state control or 
veto.35 Generation of revenue addressed in Mount Healthy went unmentioned. The 
Court instructed that the intent of the state should be considered when determining 
whether an entity should be cloaked with Eleventh Amendment immunity.36 This 
focus on state intent is more helpful than prior standards, but courts still struggled to 
determine any test that could be pulled from Lake Country. 
After Lake Country, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit addressed the issue in Morris v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.37 (“Morris”) 
by applying the factors laid out by the Supreme Court in Lake Country. The Court in 
Morris sought to determine the “nature of the entity” and whether there was “good 
reason to believe” the state structured the entity to have immunity through three 
factors: whether the state intended the entity to have sovereign immunity, the degree 
of control exerted by the state over the entity, and the extent of the entity’s impact 
on the state treasury.38 The Second and Third Circuits likewise sought to apply 
Lake Country, but placed different weights on the Lake Country factors than had 
the D.C. Circuit in Morris.39 Courts since Lake Country have confronted the Lake 
Country standards but have failed to explicitly accord them relative weight. This 
omission, according to Simpson-Wood, underscores the need for a clear standard 
for ascertaining arm-of-the-state status.40
1.  The Hess Doctrine
In 1994, the Supreme Court again addressed arm-of-the-state immunity in Hess v. 
Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation41 (“Hess”). In Hess, the Supreme Court 
handed down its most clearly articulated arm-of-the-state test to date. The issue was 
whether PATH, a compact clause entity42 created by New York and New Jersey, and 
a subsidiary of the port authorities of each state, was entitled to sovereign immunity.43 
First, the Court looked to certain of the factors discussed in previous cases, such as 
the connection between the entity and the state’s treasury, the structure of the entity, 
and the state’s control over the entity.44 Finding these inconclusive, the Court then 
returned to the “twin reasons” for the Eleventh Amendment.45 Analysis focused on 
the connection to the state treasury, and the Court concluded that if “as a practical 
matter … a judgment must expend itself against the state treasuries, common sense 
and the rationale of the Eleventh Amendment require that sovereign immunity attach 
itself to the agency.”46 A court must ask whether a State would be “in fact obligated to 
bear and pay” the indebtedness of an agency, and if the answer is “no,” “both legally 
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and practically,” then Eleventh Amendment immunity is not implicated.47 Since there 
was no substantial connection to either state treasury, the Court found PATH was 
not entitled to immunity.48
2.  Recent Developments
The current status of arm-of-the-state doctrine is unclear. While Hess presents 
us with the best method of assessment of whether a state entity enjoys immunity, 
serious gaps have allowed, or even encouraged, lower courts to develop an array 
of variations. One commentator observed that “any existing lower court precedent 
could be made to fit” with the Hess decision.49
The circuits are divided. Some, like the First, have followed the approach taken by 
the Supreme Court in Regents of the University of California v. Doe50 (“Doe”) and 
have looked to the “state’s legal liability” rather than the “practical impact of the 
judgment” (on the state’s treasury).51  In Doe, the Court addressed a claim that the 
university had violated an employment contract. The Court in Doe departed from 
the “practical matter” inquiry of Hess to focus instead on a “formalistic question of 
ultimate financial liability.”52   Other circuits have followed the Eleventh and focused 
on the “practical impact.”53
III.  PORT AUTHORITIES
A.  Generally
In the U.S., port management is usually conducted by a port authority or other entity 
which may take the form of a governmental or quasi-governmental entity. 54   Such 
an entity is an instrumentality “established by enactment or grants of authority by 
the state legislature.”55 This can take place on the state, local, or municipal level. 
Ports may also be governed by private corporation, but in the U.S., the line between 
a public entity and a private port management corporation is often blurred.56 Two 
or more states with a mutual interest in port management may, with the consent of 
Congress, found an entity by interstate compact.57 When a court must determine 
whether an entity qualifies for arm-of-the state immunity, it is usually in one of three 
settings described above,58 and it is primarily special purpose corporations and 
government entities which courts find to be entitled to share state immunity.59 
According to Mary Brooks, while port management can be structured in a multitude 
of ways, ports fall within certain patterns which can help determine the type of 
entity in question. Certain functions, such as licensing and permitting, customs, 
port monitoring, and policy control, are considered typically “governmental.” Other 
typical port functions, such as cargo handling, pilotage, line handling, marketing, and 
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waste disposal, are not definitively proprietary or governmental. Especially within 
the U.S., where port management is “fragmented with a web of public and private 
organizations involved in management at national, regional, and local levels, each 
with differing priorities, requirements, and procedures,” there is often significant 
overlap between the types of functions performed by a port management entity.60 
B.  Puerto Rico Ports Authority
The Puerto Rico Ports Authority is a government-owned corporation organized 
under the Puerto Rico Department of Transportation. It is both a government entity 
and a corporation – a “body corporate and politic … constituting a public corporation 
and government instrumentality.”61 It is created as the “successor” entity of the 
Puerto Rico Transportation Authority, but has a “legal existence and personality 
separate and apart from those of the Government and any officials thereof.” 62
The PRPA is structured to be a separate entity from the government of the 
Commonwealth, but still has close ties to Puerto Rico’s government. The 
Commonwealth is not bound by the actions of the PRPA, nor is it liable for PRPA’s 
debts.63 PRPA also has total autonomy when making decisions and has the power 
to sue and be sued.64 These factors all indicate that PRPA is separate from the 
Commonwealth. The laws of Puerto Rico also create strong ties between the 
Commonwealth and the PRPA. The strongest indication of this is Puerto Rico’s 
statutory assumption liability for certain actions arising when PRPA acts in its 
official governmental capacity.65 And while PRPA exists as a corporation, it has no 
private owners and pays no taxes, and must submit yearly financial statements to 
the legislature and Governor for approval and is audited regularly by the Controller 
of Puerto Rico.66 This indicates that while PRPA exists as an independent entity, 
the Commonwealth has a high degree of oversight over its actions. Further, while 
the Board of the PRPA is not a government entity, its officials have close ties with 
the Commonwealth, and the Governor of Puerto Rico has power over appointment 
and removal.67 Finally, PRPA is governed by laws that apply to government 
agencies generally.68
The functions of the PRPA include both private and public functions typical of port 
management entities, which is not uncommon for port authorities as described above. 
The PRPA is in charge of the development, improvement, ownership, operation, and 
management of transportation in Puerto Rico, including mass marine transport.69 
PRPA also is charged with control of the waters of Puerto Rico, its ports, docks, 
and harbor zones,70 and controls the regulation of pilot services, marine trade and 
navigation, and vessel inspection as well.71
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IV. IS THE PUERTO RICO PORTS AUTHORITY ENTITLED TO 
IMMUNITY
A.  How Courts Have Previously Treated the PRPA
A court will grant port authorities Eleventh Amendment immunity if it determines 
the entity has sufficient ties to the state. Puerto Rico, while classified as a 
“Commonwealth” and a territory, is treated as a state for sovereign immunity.72 
Despite this, courts have not treated PRPA with consistency.
The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico addressed the issue of 
PRPA’s status in Canadian Transport Co. v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority73 (“Canadian 
Transport”). In determining that the PRPA was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment 
immunity, the Court weighted two factors: whether the treasury of Puerto Rico was 
responsible for a judgment against the PRPA, and whether the agency had the 
power to sue and be sued.74 Language in the statutes governing the PRPA was 
used to make this determination.75 The First Circuit modified this test in P.R. Port. 
Auth. v. M/V Manhattan Prince.76 The Court looked to the type of activity involved in 
the suit (here, setting and enforcing harbor pilot standards), stating that determining 
immunity rested on “the type of activity [the entity] engages in and the nature of the 
claim asserted against it.”77 The Prince court ultimately concluded that, like a public 
service commission, the PRPA performed a governmental function rather than a 
proprietary one and therefore deserved immunity for a claim of pilot negligence.78
The First Circuit returned to the issue two years later in Royal Caribbean v. PRPA, 
a suit by the crew of the M/S Sovereign of the Seas for personal injury after a steel 
post on a pier broke.79 The Court determined PRPA was not entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity because it failed to demonstrate the “specific activities which 
gave rise” to the suit were governmental in nature. This case used the Prince “type 
of activity” test, but determined that in this instance, the PRPA acted as a private 
entity and not as a state actor, and was therefore not entitled to sovereign immunity.80 
A year later in Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority81 
(“Metcalf & Eddy”), the First Circuit applied seven factors and again focused on 
the distinction between “governmental or proprietary” function of an agency in 
a particular instance.82 This entity, despite its “function as a government utility,” 
was found not to be an arm of the Commonwealth as this was only one factor, 
which was outweighed by other factors weighing against the agency existing as an 
arm of the Commonwealth.83 The Court further explained that when determining 
whether an entity is qualified for immunity, the “primary concern is to minimize 
federal courts’ involvement in disbursal of state fisc.”84 The First Circuit again 
tested the arm-of-the-state doctrine, this time for a hospital, in Fresenius Medical 
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Care Cardiovascular Resources, Inc., v. Puerto Rico & Caribbean Cardiovascular 
Center Corp. (“Fresenius”),85 a suit for breach of contract. The Court invoked 
Hess for a two-step analysis: the first step looked to a state’s dignitary interest 
by examining “how the state has structured the entity.”86 This requires analysis 
of several factors to determine state intent.87 If these point in different directions, 
then a court should turn to the risk that the damages will be paid from the public 
treasury.88 This is essentially a practical  inquiry into whether the Commonwealth 
would be bound by the debts of the entity. The Court assessed the function of the 
entity within the first step, or structural analysis, of the entity, but concluded that 
the agency was not entitled to immunity as “nothing about [the entity] marks it as 
serving a uniquely governmental function.”89
The D.C. Circuit addressed PRPA’s Eleventh Amendment immunity in Puerto Rico 
Ports Authority v. Federal Maritime Commission (“PRPA v. FMC”).90 This case was 
an appeal from an administrative decision by the FMC holding that the PRPA was not 
an arm of the Commonwealth following a claim by terminal operators that the PRPA 
had violated the federal Shipping Act of 1984 in the management of its terminals. 
In overturning the decision and determining that PRPA was entitled to arm-of-the-
state immunity91, the Court applied a two-step test, looking at three factors under 
the first step. These factors are structural factors including “state intent, including 
the entity’s functions; state control; and the entity’s overall effect on the treasury.”92 
As in Fresenius, the Court considered the PRPA’s function within its analysis of 
the state’s intent. It looked to the laws of Puerto Rico to ascertain “whether PRPA 
performs functions typically performed by state governments, as opposed to 
functions ordinarily performed by local governments or non-governmental entities.”93 
With other factors, the Court concluded that the PRPA was entitled to immunity as 
“PRPA’s enabling act and Puerto Rico’s Dock and Harbor Act indicate that PRPA 
performs its functions to promote the ‘general welfare’ and to increase ‘commerce 
and prosperity’ for the benefit of ‘the People of Puerto Rico,” which can be classified 
as a primarily governmental function.94
B.  Grajales v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority
A look at the inconsistencies in cases dealing with Eleventh Amendment immunity 
in Puerto Rico shows the lack of an adequate test. This is further demonstrated by 
the First Circuit’s holding this past year in Grajales v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority.95 
In Grajales, the Court purported to follow Hess, Fresenius, and PRPA v. FMC by 
analyzing PRPA’s status in two steps.96 In the first, the intent of Puerto Rico in 
creating the PRPA is ascertained by looking to various “structural indicators.”97
While the First Circuit looked to the same factors as had the D.C. Circuit in PRPA 
v. FMC, the First Circuit concluded that they do not show that the Commonwealth 
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“clearly structured [PRPA] to share its sovereignty.”98 This led to divergent results 
between the two circuits, despite the similarity in factors examined. The Grajales 
Court knew of this discrepancy and even addressed it directly. While the D.C. 
Circuit had focused on the “governmental-versus-proprietary functions” of an entity 
in general “as the test for assessing the sovereign immunity of a special purpose 
corporation,” the First Circuit, according to the Court, had “expressly departed from 
that narrow focus.”99 Rather, after Fresenius, the First Circuit had shifted away 
from a “case-specific” analysis of the functions of an entity for examining structural 
indicators as a whole.100 In light of Hess and, subsequently Fresenius, the functions 
of an entity, according to the First Circuit, are to be considered with other structural 
indicators in the first step of Hess.101 The distinction between proprietary and 
government functions is no longer treated as dispositive, but the structural indicators 
as a whole are to be considered.102 
While the Court declined to address the proprietary-versus-government distinction, 
it addressed the general function of the PRPA with other factors in the first step 
of its analysis with the relationship of the PRPA to the Commonwealth’s fisc, the 
characterization of PRPA under Commonwealth law, and the control exerted by the 
Commonwealth over PRPA. Under this first step, the Court found that the majority 
of factors pointed away from PRPA being an arm, or were inconclusive. Only the 
governmental control factor pointed clearly towards PRPA being an arm, as the 
Commonwealth does “exercise a meaningful degree of control and supervision over 
the PRPA.”103 The laws of the Commonwealth, according to the Court, characterize 
the PRPA as an “instrumentality of the Commonwealth,” but also indicate it has 
a “legal existence and personality separate and apart” from the Government.104 
In assessing PRPA’s function, the description of PRPA’s function as “promoting 
the ‘general welfare’ and ‘increas[ing] commerce and prosperity … for the people 
of Puerto Rico” was not sufficient to indicate that PRPA is an arm.105 Rather, the 
functions of the PRPA include a “mix of functions of which some are characteristic 
of arms and others are not.”106 In analyzing the fiscal relationship between the PRPA 
and the Commonwealth, the Court concluded that the connection was not sufficient 
to establish PRPA as an arm. Despite a statutory commitment by the Commonwealth 
to pay PRPA’s tort damages, the law still “reserves the ‘wall’ between PRPA’s liability 
and the Commonwealth’s fisc.”107
The Court found no clear answer under the first step of the test, as the factors 
pointed in different directions. The Court then moved on to the second step, 
which the Court addressed briefly, indicating that the “picture is quite clear” that 
PRPA’s potential liability poses no risk to the Commonwealth’s fisc.108 The Court 
looked to the structure and design of the PRPA to determine that it is essentially an 
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independent financial entity from the Commonwealth for the purposes of liability.109 
The Court concluded that the PRPA had not “met its burden to show that it is an 
arm of the Commonwealth” under step two, and is therefore not entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity in the suit.110
V. AFTER GRAJALES: OUTSTANDING ISSUES FACING THE 
PRPA’S STATUS AS AN ARM OF THE COMMONWEALTH
The First Circuit’s most recent conclusion regarding the status of PRPA has further 
complicated an already thorny area of law, leaving a circuit split between the D.C. 
and First Circuits on the status of PRPA. The lack of a clear determination of Puerto 
Rico’s status under the Constitution, the failure of any court to adhere to a consistent 
test, even within a single circuit, and lack of guidance from higher courts on the 
weight accorded to various factors have left the status of PRPA’s vulnerability to suit 
on shaky ground.
A.   Whether a determination on an entity’s status as an “arm” is 
dispositive is unclear, leading to diverging conclusions within a 
single circuit.
One question that remains open is whether a judicial determination of the status 
of an entity is dispositive in future cases. The D.C. Circuit has held that the “status 
of an entity does not change from one case to the next,”111 but “once an entity is 
determined to be an arm of the State … that conclusion applies unless and until 
there are relevant changes in the state law governing the entity.”112 However, other 
circuits have failed to adopt this conclusion. This is precisely what has happened 
to PRPA. While the law governing PRPA has not changed, its status in relation to 
Puerto Rico’s sovereign immunity has changed from case to case and fact pattern 
to fact pattern. 
B.   PRPA’s status under Puerto Rican Law indicates that the functionality 
test may be most appropriate, but courts have failed to follow this 
standard consistently.
In particular, courts addressing PRPA’s status have failed to determine whether 
the functionality of PRPA is dispositive; that is, does the action performed by the 
PRPA (or any entity) giving rise to a cause of action in a particular case determine 
whether the entity is entitled to immunity? Using the function of an entity as a factor 
in determining whether it qualifies as an arm can be traced back to Hess113 and 
is still used by many courts,114 as demonstrated in Grajales.115 However, the way 
this test is applied varies between circuits and, sometimes, even within the same 
circuit. Whether there is (or ought to be) a distinction between a general inquiry into 
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the functions of an entity or a case specific one is unclear. In Grajlaes, the Court 
claimed to be following precedent in Fresenius in assessing the general functions 
of the PRPA rather than the specific ones giving rise to the suit. One particularly 
problematic issue with this method is that the laws of the Commonwealth itself 
treat the liability of the PRPA differently depending on context. Most notably, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico assumes exclusive liability for damages caused by 
the PRPA or the actions of the Administrator or other employee when the PRPA’s 
actions may be considered official or governmental in nature.116 Especially if the First 
Circuit claims to consider how the Commonwealth treats the entity in its assessment 
of liability, with a focus on the statutory structure of the entity, this directly contradicts 
the Court’s decision not to address the nature of the action of the PRPA in any 
specific context in its test. The functional sorting of entities has been and should 
remain an influential part of an analysis of an entity’s status, but especially when 
a sovereign has made the specific function of an entity as relevant for liability as 
has Puerto Rico for the PRPA, the consideration of the specific function in question 
remains relevant. Both the holistic approach of the D.C. Circuit and the structural 
approach of the Eleventh miss the mark.
VI. CONCLUSION
The status of the PRPA in U.S. courts is unclear. Courts have differed in their 
assignment of weight of the factors in Hess, and have refrained from making the 
relative weight accorded the factors explicit. Puerto Rico’s ability to manage the 
PRPA as a government corporation will eventually be eroded due to this lack 
of consistency. If arm of the state policy allows efficient organization by local 
governments without fear of liability, then how should Puerto Rico treat the PRPA 
when different courts can reach different interpretations of the same statute, 
allowing the PRPA different status from case-to-case? If the purpose is to promote 
economic partnerships between the Commonwealth and private entities (which the 
Commonwealth might even fund for state purposes), this goal is also frustrated by 
the inability to predict PRPA’s status in any situation. 
Given the uncertain status of the PRPA, Puerto Rico is left with the question of how 
to treat local entities with which it interacts substantially, especially the PRPA. Port 
authorities, like many government corporations, are both sources of income for the 
state and business partners and actors in vital state business.117 The inability of the 
Commonwealth to predict how a court will view PRPA, even when Puerto Rico has 
characterized the entity as an arm through traditional mechanisms like legislation, 
compromises its ability to govern and control such entities.
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The claim of many courts in clothing arms-of-the-state with Eleventh Amendment 
is the end goal of protection of state’s dignitary interests. Courts consistently look 
to how the state itself treats this entity, primarily by examining how the state has 
structured the entity through legislation. Under Puerto Rican law, PRPA is treated 
differently by the Commonwealth depending on what type of activity is being 
performed. Embracing the “type of activity” test in a context-specific inquiry is an 
excellent starting point for future courts to determine PRPA’s status. Doing so would 
promote consistency by deferring to the Commonwealth’s treatment of the entity, 
and would promote public policy by allowing PRPA and the Commonwealth to 
predict when and if PRPA and the Commonwealth might be open to liability. This, in 
turn, would promote the goals of granting an entity like a port authority with immunity 
in the first place. 
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